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Discussion After the Speeches of Richard 0. Cunningham
and Richard S. Gottlieb
QUESTION, Professor King: I have a couple questions for Richard
Cunningham.
In terms of the reaction of other nations to our exchange rate
changes. It was said that in each case the foreign countries tried to main-
tain a position in the market. In terms of this experience can we learn
anything for future reference? Are some of these tied into the financing
of national plans? Do we need a national plan, in terms of a national
economic blueprint of our future, and if so, is it feasible?
ANSWER, Mr. Cunningham: The conclusion that I draw from it is
that, first, you cannot blindly rely on exchange rates to do the work that
has been traditionally expected of them unless you are prepared either to
wait much longer for them to be effective, accepting much more uncer-
tainty as their effectiveness, or you are very serious about combating re-
sponses by foreign governments and businesses. There have been
proposals knocked about in the United States to try to use the anti-
dumping law more effectively, or as I would say, more belligerently. Ja-
pan is the most clear example of that as when the U.S. Secretary of Com-
merce hopped on a plane, flew over to Japan and said, "You're all
dumping, and you better get your prices up or we're going to lower the
boom on you." This statement lost some of its effect when he was repri-
manded by others in the administration and the rest of its effect when the
"boom" was not in fact lowered.
You have to think about whether you want to use y6ur anti-dump-
ing law more aggressively or you want to talk with foreign countries
about persuading their exporters to behave in a certain way. You also
have to consider how you want to deal with that sort of situation if you
are going to rely on exchange rates to try to change your trade deficit
situation. My own view is that also you need to, from time to time, think
in terms of fighting fire with fire. But you have to be very judicious about
that. By fire with fire, I mean that sometimes counter subsidization may
be a better alternative than imposing barriers to the foreign countries'
subsidization.
A lot of times that may not be true, but you ought to think about the
choices and you ought to be flexible rather than doctrinal.
COMMENT, Ms. Dallmeyer: I have a comment on the
macro/micro dichotomy here. I am not sure that you really want to
encourage the microeconomic aspect because sometimes those do not
turn out as expected. The example that comes to mind is the semicon-
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ductor pact, which originally started out as an anti-dumping movement,
inspired by American companies, a section 301 complaint initiated by
Commerce, which then got subsumed into negotiation, resulting in a
pact. In this pact the Japanese were to stop selling at less than fair value
and to increase market access, so the immediate effect was to raise prices,
which damaged users in the United States. It stimulated the growth of
dumping into third markets. When the United States put pressure on the
Japanese to end the dumping into third markets, they instituted floor
prices in Japan, they instituted production quotas in Japan, and then
they instituted the more extensive and time consuming export licensing
regime which overwhelmed their ability to handle all of this paperwork.
That also happened to coincide with an upturn in the computer
market, so it benefited the Japanese producers immediately because they
were no longer involved in cutting each other's throats in Japan because
they had floor prices. The American producers could not get what they
needed to meet the user demand and did not increase their production
capacity to meet this need. Thus, there was no stimulus to go abroad
when they could meet all of their needs here in the United States, so
maybe microeconomic management is not the answer either. It also
serves as a caveat to companies that pursue an anti-dumping complaint,
to show them that it might not get them what they started out after and
it might not have the benefit that they thought it would have when they
initiated it.
COMMENT, Mr. Cunningham: There are dangers to micro-
economic reponses to trade problems, and an example of that is the at-
tempt to deal with a trade problem in semiconductors in a micro-
economic way.
Those points are well taken. Far be it for me to say that all micro
responses are good responses. One does have to be very careful about it,
and a stupid micro response can be one of the stupidest things you can do
in trade. There might have been other micro ways to go after our goal.
Pushing access to the Japanese market was fine, but we might have been
better off to subsidize our chip makers than to have tried to limit Japa-
nese pricing of chips. I will not yeild my point that micro responses are
worth considering, but I would say that response in particular was a
dumb one that did not work out well.
COMMENT, Dr. McNiven: I did not have too much trouble with
some of the trends that Mr. Cunningham was going through, but there
seemed to be an assumption behind a lot of what you said, that somehow
America companies do not get subsidies and those dirty, rotten foreign-
ers do.
The first thing I would like to mention is the late and unlamented
industrial revenue bond. It has a continuing subsidiary effect as of last
year of only $13.2 billion per year until the last bond runs out some
twenty years from now. That is a lot of money to subsidize industries.
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Second, I started poking around about tax expenditures, which is an
ideological thing in the United States. In Canada, we can find our tax
expenditures by asking the Federal Government, and they have to cough
up the numbers. If you go around to the State Governments in the
United States, you will find that six of them report tax expenditures. The
other forty-four do not.
Now, this does not mean they do not give them; it means they do
not report them. So therefore, there is no subsidy because it is not
counted. That is a very interesting way of not subsidizing industry.
When you start poking around in this what you find is that the U.S.
system is just rife with dollars being shifted under tables to industry. We
should not pretend that it is only the French or the Japanese that are
doing this. We are doing it in the United States, and doing it with buck-
ets and front-end loaders and God knows what all, but it is all kept very
quiet.
QUESTION, Professor King: Did you have any comments on the
references made to industrial revenue bonds?
ANSWER, Mr. Cunningham: It was a rank accusation that the
purest nation in the world sometimes, indeed, frequently and pervasively
engages in subsidization. The defense pleads guilty.
I certainly would not take the position that the United States is pure
and everybody else is impure. What I am saying is the United States
should not pretend that we are going to be pure and play everything
macro when we in fact do a lot of micro stuff. The United States should
think about each individual trade issue, think about what is a good re-
sponse to it and not always say that we cannot subsidize in response to
other subsidies. We need to work out the proper response, negotiate it
with the adverse trading partner and get it worked out.
COMMENT, Mr. Bertrand: You are talking about micro versus
macro responses, but hearing you and looking at it from the outside, I
wonder what else there is to do for the United States but to react in this
way. It seems like the United States is reacting on all fronts at the same
time, whereas the Japanese are trying to fine tune what they have estab-
lished over the past twenty years. Consequently, it is very easy for them
to go and help the aluminum industries where it is probably one of the
five topics they have on their priority list, whereas the United States is
really caught shorthanded, and the only way to go about it is to try to
make the best of it.
COMMENT, Mr. Cunningham: Well, I have to grant some of that.
In some ways one looks at Japan with admiration. In some ways, obvi-
ously, the Japanese have not done everything right either. The Japanese
government a long time ago decided the automobile industry was not one
that had a lot of prospects and they tried to downplay the U.S. car mar-
ket, but that that did not turn out to be right. Nobody is perfect. What I
would say in response to you is that we have not been as sophisticated as
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we could be. The past does not lead to the response that the problem has
to be dealt with in broad sweeping macro terms now because it is too late
to start the micro. You have got to start to work and to deal with the
problems as best you can.
One of the things that we have to learn to do is use microeconomic
tools to support macroeconomic policy. The United States, in my view,
should have made two things known if it was going to use the dollar
decline as a way of getting the trade deficit down.
First, it should have been very aggressive in getting a broader spec-
trum of countries to let their currencies flow against the dollar, including
the Asian NIPs. Second, it should have, as to the developed countries,
adopted some means, whether it would be anti-dumping monitoring or
something like that, to try to force a more rapid price change in response
to the dollar decline. It may well be that the dollar decline was not the
way to do it, and the way to do it would have been more managed trade
flows, which was what a lot of the European countries have done.
COMMENT, Mr. Magnus: I would like to bring things around to a
Canadian policy issue if I could for a moment.
Rationalization presents a very serious problem from a Canadian
perspective, which either will have to be dealt with legislatively or
through adjustment. It also has significant ramifications for U.S. inves-
tors in Canada.
If you rationalize an industry that makes widgets, where you made
three sizes of widgets in Canada, small, medium and large, and now you
only make medium widgets after you rationalize, and you then get a
third country dumping or subsidization of small widgets, you effectively
lose your remedy in Canada against that third country dumping. It be-
comes peculiarly a Canadian problem because when you rationalize, in
all liklihood, as in the auto industry, you rationalize to make in Canada
approximately what you will sell in Canada, and you make in the United
States approximately what will sell in the United States. The susceptibil-
ity of the Canadian market to injurious dumping after you have rational-
ized is exceedingly high. At the present time, particularly in light of the
tribunal decisions in the Honda case, there is going to be a fundamental
problem which I suspect the drafters of the FTA really did not recognize.
I further suggest that from a bilateral standpoint, neither the Cana-
dian policymakers nor the U.S. policymakers would be against some sort
of policy tinkering with a Special Import Measures Act in order to deal
with this problem. Otherwise what we are going see is a need in Canada
for significant adjustment payments as there is displacement from third
country dumping.
QUESTION, Mr. Fried: A question for both Mr. Gottlieb and Mr.
Cunningham. It is really a question of theory versus practice. In a bilat-
eral context we have two markets of substantially different size. The
United States has been traditionally almost purely a domestic market. It
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is not at all as dependent on exports as Canada and will not be even with
an export push. Canada, of course, is an export-oriented market. The
trade laws themselves in the GATT are an American based system.
United States brought it to the GATT and the GATT disseminated the
system to the rest of the world.
The United States, therefore, through not only serving its own
domestic market, but also by taking in exports of other countries and
helping to fuel their growths, has tremendous leverage through the appli-
cation of its trade laws because they are geared to target exports from
other countries.
Canada, on the other hand, might be injured by virtue of import
subsitution. Unfair practices from other countries which deny Canadi-
ans export opportunities and which provide for domestic replacement of
what was once an exported product could be very harmful.
In that light, if the direction of trade laws continues to be export-
oriented, and if the rationalization of production and the multinational
sourcing of manufactured goods does continue, does there not have to be
a fundamental change in the discipline applied to governments and pri-
vate parties in their pricing practices? A change which would come to
grips not only with the export effects, but the import substitution or the
investment and production distorting effects, whether or not exports are
involved. Is that a practical possibility?
Before you answer, if I may answer Mr. Magnus. The problem that
you and Mr. Gottlieb have identified was very much on the minds of
both countries at the FTA negotiations and will continue to be. The
acknowledgment of both sides was basically that adjustment and ration-
alization will occur, and will occur across the ten years during which
tariffs and other barriers will be reduced and eliminated. Thus, there is
more than sufficient time to make sure that the necessary protection and
the necessary implication for the situation that you described can be
addressed.
ANSWER, Mr. Cunningham: I have not yet drafted the explicit
clauses of the final agreement dealing with the topics about which you
spoke. Some things do come to mind, however. There are some difficult
ways to approach the evolution of U.S.-Canada free trade and there are
some easier ways to approach it. The way that probably presents the
greatest difficulty is getting the trust to make more discretionary or to
make inapplicable to Canada the U.S. countervailing, anti-dumping laws.
It is very hard. Just looking at it from a U.S. standpoint, it is desirable
dumping, but in the United States subsidies and dumping will never be
split. You never say "never" in trade, but it is hard for me to see, politi-
cally, that they will split. On the other hand, it does strike me that there
are two responses to the question that you pose. One is that it should be
very much in the interest of both the United States and Canada in the
future to think more as a team versus the rest of the world on global and
North America market issues, their negotiating positions in coordination
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of discretionary acts, and in bilateral talks. The other response that oc-
curs to me is that there is a lot being done in. the United States and in the
EC with respect to the diversion-related issues of trade restrictions. The
focus so far has been to allow a country that imposes anti-dumping duties
to deal with the situation where the response of the foreign company is to
either bring in the goods from an affiliated facility in another country or
to even set up an assembly plant in the country which imposed the duty
and thus avoid the duty. There are now in the EC explicit rules on this.
It is not too long a conceptual jump to working out diversionary rules
going the other way and working out some protection for Canada from
the effects of U.S. trade action of the type about which you are talking.
How those rules might specifically work, I have not thought through
enough but it is not such a radical departure from what is being done in
the other areas that it is inconceivable that something could be done
there.
QUESTION, Mr. Fried: If I may, even putting aside any third
country at all, a U.S. subsidy to a domestic subsidiary gives to that sub-
sidiary a certain niche in the U.S. market. There are no exports to Can-
ada. The Canadian competitor trying to get into the U.S. market cannot
compete if the United States has domestically owned subsidies. Does
that mean trade laws, whether or not in a free trade area, should take
into account that fact rather than just the support?
ANSWER, Mr. Cunningham: The mechanics of solving that prob-
lem do not jump to me at the moment, but it is not a problem that has
the same degree of political resistance in the United States that the pro-
tection of U.S. industries from "unfair" practices has. Some creative
thinking on that can come up with some creative solutions.
COMMENT, Mr. Gottlieb: Section 5902 that I referred to earlier, at
least on the Canadian side, seems very broad because it would not allow
for virtually any type of measures to be taken against a foreign country
which resorts to acts, policies or practices that discriminate or otherwise
adversely affect or lead directly or indirectly to an adverse affect on trade
in Canadian goods or services. That is so broad that I think it could
allow us to do anything against anyone who is hasty.
QUESTION, Professor King: I have one question for Richard Got-
tlieb. In terms of adjustment assistance, would you comment on the Ca-
nadian posture in terms of changes that must be made in an operation to
get adjustment assistance? Richard Cunningham mentioned the possibil-
ity in the United States where instead of just getting the relief, you have
got to do something in the way of improving some on the problems
which put you out of the ballgame. Did you want to comment on that
and the situation there in Canada?
ANSWER, Mr. Gottlieb: Well, traditionally, our Government does
impose conditions in the context of restructuring a manufacturer or an
industry. That has happened in footwear, for example, where hundreds
of millions of dollars have been all implicated. There has to be very defi-
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nite commitments made by manufacturers, which are monitored, and
payments and other benefits are conditional upon meeting timetables and
commitments. Of course, there are a number of avenues for this, but that
is the kind of thing that is contemplated.
COMMENT, Mr. Salembier: Just on that point, I was interested to
see that Richard Cunningham picked up on the idea that a company
might be able to use the need for adjustment to pressure for some reform
in U.S. trade policy. There is a good deal of superficial appeal to that.
When I heard that, I was reminded of something that I saw in a
walk around here. I saw, in a tree, a woodpecker. It was going to ham-
mer away at that tree for a while, and you can be sure it was going to get
the bugs out of it, but the tree was still going to be fine. You are going to
try to pressure for changes in U.S. trade policy, but the underlying struc-
ture is still there. You still have instruments which are designed, how-
ever, to deliver protection. It occurs to me as well that a lot of the things
that you were talking about in the way of tripartite agreements to pro-
duce some business sounds a lot like the industrial policy ideas that are
coming up in the Democratic party. I think we are directed to quite a
different purpose.
COMMENT, Mr. Cunningham: I will confess I am not a total foe
of industrial policy. I am cautious and skeptical of some full-blown ver-
sions of it, but I have some sympathy for it because other countries
around the world are doing it.
COMMENT, Professor King: Well, we have had a very fine session
this evening. I want to thank both Richard Cunningham, and Richard
Gottlieb for their excellent presentations.
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